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Abstract: Sensors are commonly deployed in hostile environment, and consequently a number
of research works have focused on data aggregation schemes designed to be tolerant to attacks on
sensor nodes. In parallel, schemes ensuring the confidentiality of sensor data have been proposed
to address the emerging privacy concerns. We note that resilience against tampering attacks
requires access to the sensor node’s data, while in privacy-preserving systems this data must
remain confidential. In this work, we aim to reconcile these two seemingly conflicting objectives.
We present a novel private and resilient aggregation system, in which an aggregator combines the
data collected from sensor nodes and forwards the resulting sum to an analyst. Our scheme protects
the privacy of the users from both honest-but-curious aggregator and analyst, while enabling the
filtering of fake data values using a Private Range Test protocol.
Key-words: resilience, privacy, data aggregation, sensor networks
Agrégation de données résiliente et privée
Résumé : Les réseaux de capteurs peuvent être déployés dans un environnement hostile.
Ainsi un nombre de travaux de recherche se sont intéressés à des systèmes d’agrégation de
données tolérant aux attaques sur les noeuds. Parallèlement des techniques garantissant la
confidentialité des données collectées par les réseaux de capteurs ont été proposées afin de faire
face à la problématique de vie privée. La tolérance aux attaques sur les capteurs nécessite
un accès aux données retournées par ceux-ci, alors que la protection de la vie privée nécessite
justement que ces données restent confidentielles. Le but de ce travail est de réconcilier ces deux
objectifs qui apparaissent comme conflictuels. Nous présentons un nouveau système d’agrégation
capable de tolérer les attaques sur les noeuds tout en préservant la confidentialité des données
des capteurs. Ce système inclut un agrégateur qui collecte et combine les données provenant
des capteurs et renvoi le résultat à l’utilisateur final appelé analyste. Ce système protège la
vie privée des utilisateurs face à un couple agrégateur/analyste ”curieux mais honnête”. Il
permet également de données les données contrôlées par un attaquant en utilisant un protocole
de ”Private Range Test” basé sur la théorie du calcul sécurisé multipartie.
Mots-clés : résilience, vie privée, agrégation de données, réseaux de capteurs
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1 Introduction
Sensor networks and smart metering systems are becoming increasingly popular. The payload
of these networks is often highly sensitive for the users and the absence of security or privacy
features has enabled researchers to demonstrate significant privacy leaks in such networks [2, 25].
However, any security and privacy solution has to consider the potentially conflicting goals of
the analyst and the end user. First, the analyst expects to receive useful data from a group
of deployed sensors. Therefore, it should be possible to link the sensors to the data they are
providing to the system or, as a minimum requirement, a set of sensors controlled by the attacker
should not be able to alter the quality of the information delivered to the analyst. The end-users
wish to protect their privacy and avoid profiling and de-anonimization, therefore they expect
the analyst to have access only to coarse grained information. Our work aims to reconcile the
requirements of both parties, in the context of sensor networks performing data aggregation.
Data aggregation enables a trade-off between communication and computation costs, and is
often used in sensor networks to save energy or improve capacity. The values of the sensors
are combined by an aggregator, and the result is then sent to the analyst for further processing.
Numerous works [10, 26, 28, 24] have targeted independently the resilience or the privacy aspects
of data aggregation schemes, but very few have attempted to solve both problems at the same
time. In our work, resilient aggregation ensures the robustness of the aggregation result in the
presence of fake sensor readings. Indeed, nodes are deployed in an hostile environment and, in
addition to potentially being faulty, are vulnerable to attacks. An adversary that controls a node
can send fake readings to the aggregator and influence the result to their advantage. A solution
RR n° 8330
4 Cunche & Lauradoux & Minier
supported by many research works consists of verifying that the reported values belong to a
predetermined valid range. This is potentially highly intrusive, if it is done on plaintext data.
In parallel, solutions to preserve privacy using homomorphic encryption have been proposed.
Here, the aggregator does not have access to plaintext sensor data and aggregation is performed
by combining encrypted sensor data values. However, this step in the (right) direction of privacy
prevents the aggregator from inspecting the data to determine whether it is in the valid range.
This paper addresses the challenge of enabling the verification of the range of encrypted data
values prior to using them in the aggregation.
We consider a flat sensor network architecture, in which all sensors are directly connected to
an aggregator that collects and combines the received values, before sending the aggregate to an
analyst. The sensors can be controlled by an attacker and send fake values to influence the final
result. Our contribution focuses on aggregation functions based on the sum operation.
Our contributions are as follows. We propose a system that provides private and resilient data
aggregation, based on additive homomorphic encryption and Private Range Test. The former
enables data aggregation while ensuring data confidentiality. Private Range Test allows the
aggregator to test if an encrypted data lies in a given interval, without having to access the
plaintext or gaining any additional information other than the result of the test. In the proposed
system, the values reported by the sensors are individually verified using the Private Range Test.
We then propose an optimization of the system to reduce the verification cost by the Aggregated
Private Range Test (effective for scenarios with a small number of compromized nodes, i.e. up
to 17), however with some reduction of accuracy. We have implemented and tested the Private
Range Test protocol, demonstrating the practicality of our scheme with a Range Test taking
only 108msec to execute.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines our goal for private and resilient ag-
gregation and the model of adversary. The core idea of our protocol is given in Section 3. To
overcome the potentially high complexity of the first protocol, a second scheme implementing
compromise between accuracy and complexity is presented in Section 4. Practical considerations
are discussed in Section 5. Other possible solutions are summed up in Section 6 whereas Section 7
gives the position of this work in the literature. Finally, Section 8 concludes this paper.
2 System goals and the security model
We are considering a system including: a set of n sensors, an aggregator in charge of aggregating
the data received from the sensors and an analyst that must obtain the sum y =
∑n
i=1 xi where
the xi denote the values measured by the sensors. At each round, every sensor transmits a unit
of data to the aggregator which in turn transmits the aggregate to the analyst. The system











Figure 1: System architecture comprising an aggregator and an analyst.
Most systems providing privacy preserving aggregation include an aggregator located between
Inria
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the data sources and the analyst. Its role is to aggregate the data received from the data
sources and forward the result, y, to the analyst. This architecture has been adopted in several
privacy-preserving aggregation solution [1, 13, 11] as it allows the distribution of aggregation and
decryption tasks to two distinct entities, thus limiting the risk of a privacy breach.
A report is considered as bogus (resp. genuine ) when its value is different from (resp. equal
to) the real value.
The proposed system aims to satisfy the following objectives:
• Privacy - The internal and external attackers should not be able to access the data of
individual sensors.
• Resilience - The system should be tolerant to bogus data sent by the compromised or faulty
sensors. Even in the presence of bogus data, the system must still be able to compute the
aggregate with a small error margin.
• Complexity - Computational cost for the elements of the system should be as low as possible.
In particular the operations performed by the sensors should be in line with the limited
computation resources of embedded systems.
We make the following hypothesis. First, there is an interval [0, .., q], call the valid interval,
in which should fall all genuine data measured by the sensors. This is for instance the case of a
number of physical measurements like temperature inside a building, or energy consumption of
a household. Thanks to the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme any interval can be
shifted to an interval of the form [0, .., q]. Reports falling in the valid interval are said to be valid,
and reports that do not fall in this interval are said to be invalid. We assume that a genuine
report is always valid, and that a bogus report can be either invalid or valid (a value different
from the real value but that remains in the valid range) .
Second, the values xi can be controlled by an attacker, called the correctness attacker, whose
goal is to control the aggregated value y. This assumption was the motivation of the seminal
of Wagner [28] and it was later used in subsequent works [6]. As nodes are very cheap devices,
they are not assumed tamper-resistant: they are an obvious target for the adversary to mount
an attack. Let y be the result of the aggregation without the action of an attacker and ŷ the
aggregation result after the action of the attacker. The error induced by the attack is denoted:
∆ = |y − ŷ|. The goal of the attacker is to maximize the error ∆. To counter this attacker, we
aim at designing a system that limits the impact of the attack on the result, i.e. minimize ∆.
Third, there is an attacker, called the privacy attacker whose goal is to obtain information on
the sensors’ data. This attacker correspond to the aggregator and the analyst that are assumed
to be honest-but-curious adversaries, i.e. they are willing to execute correctly the communication
protocol but they are interested in getting information on the individual values xi. Therefore,
the aggregator is not allowed to manipulate the values xi in the clear. We also assume that the
aggregator and the analyst are not colluding.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that these two attackers (the correctness
attacker and the privacy attacker) are merged to in the analysis of a data aggregation system.
Finally, we assume that all the cryptographic materials (keys, encryption algorithms, etc.)
are already loaded into the sensors. We assume that this step is done through secure channel or
other methods. We also assume that there exist secure channels between the aggregator and the
analyst.
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3 Invalid data filtering using Range Test
In this section, we propose a new private and resilient aggregation scheme. The privacy core of
our design comes from the use of a partially homomorphic public key cryptosystem as in [23]. We
are using an additive homomorphic encryption scheme; we are therefore limited to aggregation
functions based on the addition such as the sum or the average.
The resilience of our scheme relies on the private range test protocol proposed in [21, 22].
It filters out invalid values while preserving their confidentiality. The private range test RT is
a two party protocol in which two non-colluding parties A1 and A2 can verify if a ciphertext c
lies in a given range [0, .., q] without revealing the plaintext. A short description of the range
test protocol proposed in [22] is made in Appendix A. This protocol requires two homomorphic
public key cryptosystems, E1(.), D1(.) and E2(.), D2(.), which private keys are held by the an-
alyst. Only the first cryptosystem is used by the sensors to encrypt their data. The second
cryptosystem is employed by the aggregator and the analyst for the range test protocol. Let us
denote RT (A1, A2, c, [0, .., q]) the invocation of a range test protocol between A1 and A2. The
function returns TRUE if c belongs to [0, .., q] and FALSE otherwise. In the rest of the paper, A1
refers to the aggregator and A2 to the analyst.
Our system is presented in Fig. 2 and uses the following protocol composed of four steps:
1. Data encryption: each sensor takes the sensed value xi, encrypts it with the analyst
public key and an homomorphic cryptosystem into ci = E1(xi). Then each sensor sends
the ci value to A1.
2. Data-filtering: The aggregator A1 uses the range test RT (A1, A2, ci, [0, .., q]) to filter out
the invalid reading received during the previous step. During this phase the aggregator A1
collaborates with the data analyst A2, in order to perform the range test and to know if
each value ci belongs to the interval [0, .., q] (see Algorithm 1).
3. Aggregation: The aggregator A1 sums the valid values thanks to the homomorphic prop-
erties of the cryptosystem and sends the aggregated result to the analyst A2.
4. Result decryption: The analyst A2 decrypts the aggregated result received from the




















Figure 2: Private and resilient aggregation with range test.
During the protocol, the individual values are tested but never revealed to the analyst neither
to the aggregator thanks to the range test (see details in Appendix A). They only know if
individual values lie on a given interval or not.
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Algorithm 1 Data Filtering
Require: [0..q], {c1, . . . , cn}
Ensure: ∀ c ∈ V, c ∈ [0, .., q]
V ← ∅
for each c ∈ {c1, . . . , cn} do
if RT(A1, A2, c, [0, .., q]) = TRUE then
V ← V ∪ {c}
end if
end for
4 Aggregated Range Test
4.1 Protocol description
As noted before, the verification step puts the aggregator and the analyst under a heavy com-
putational load as they are performing a range test on each ciphertext. We propose to reduce
the number of range tests by performing a partial aggregation before the verification step. The
ciphertexts are divided and aggregated by subgroups before being submitted to the range test
on a larger interval. Each subgroup is submitted to a q-homogeneous range test (see Definition
1); i.e. a subgroup composed of r values {xi}1≤i≤r is tested on the interval [0, .., rq] (rather than
on [0, .., q] for the basic approach).
Definition 1 Let {xi}1≤i≤r be r values, {λi}1≤i≤r be r integers, q ∈ Z and let Agg =
∑
1≤i≤r λixi
be the corresponding sub-aggregate. We say that the double inequality α ≤ Agg ≤ β is q-
homogeneous iff, α = a.q, β = b.q and β − α = Λq, where Λ =
∑
1≤i≤r λi, and a and b are two
integers. The associated range test RT(A1, A2, E1(Agg), [α, .., β]) is said q-homogeneous.
The complete protocol works as follows:
1. Data encryption: each sensor takes the sensed value xi, encrypts it with the first homo-
morphic cryptosystem into ci = E1(xi) and transmits it to the aggregator A1.
2. Partial aggregation: The aggregator A1 aggregates together r received ciphertexts:
Agg = E1(x1)× · · · × E1(xr) = E1(x1 + · · ·+ xr).
3. Data-filtering: The aggregator A1 collaborates with the analyst A2 in order to perform
the range test RT (A1, A2, Agg, [0, .., rq]) on the partial sum testing if the Agg value belongs
to the interval [0, .., rq] or not.
• If the Agg result belongs to [0, .., rq], then the current aggregate is marked as valid.
• If not, two strategies are possible: the aggregator A1 completely discards the partial
sum Agg or it narrows down the investigation in order to identify and discard invalid
reports until a valid partial sum is obtained (see Subsection 4.3 for more details).
4. Aggregation: The aggregator A1 combines the valid partial sums thanks to the homo-
morphic properties of the first cryptosystem and sends the aggregated result to the analyst
A2.
5. Result decryption: The analyst A2 decrypts the aggregated and encrypted result re-
ceived from the aggregator A1. This result is the sum of the values comprised in the valid
partial sum.
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One advantage of the aggregated range test is that the cost of the aggregation operation is
much smaller than the cost of a range test and it could be re-used for the final aggregation.
4.2 Bounds on the aggregate error
This technique reduces the global number of range tests (from n calls to the range test to n/r
calls to the range test), but it also reduces the efficiency of the filtering, as an invalid value can
pass the aggregated range test. However we can derive bounds on the error that an attacker can
cause as a function of the number of nodes controlled by the attacker, the number of sensors, n,
and the aggregation subgroup size, r.
Lets consider a subgroup of size r, in which the correctness attacker controls one element.
Note that the reasoning would be the same if the attacker wanted to minimize the aggregate
value. The worst case is when the r − 1 genuine values are equal to 0. The maximum value
that the compromised sensor can send without being detected is qr. The attacker can therefore
add an error of δ = q.(r − 1) in each aggregation subgroup. Since the reports of a subgroup are
aggregated before the test, it does not matter whether if the error comes from a single sensor or
from multiple ones. In other words, controlling multiple values per subgroup would not increase
the maximum error that the correctness attacker could induce without being detected. In a
system of size n, an attacker controlling at least one value in b subgroups can induce a global
error on the sum of amplitude ∆ = b.q.(r − 1). The corresponding error on the average is
∆′ = ∆/n = b.q.(r − 1)/n.
If the attacker has managed to compromise at least one sensor in each subgroup, then b = n/r,
the error on the sum is ∆ = n/r.q.(r − 1) = n.q.(r − 1)/r and the error on the average is
∆′ = q.(r− 1)/r. The amplitude of this error could be considered as too large (it is of the order
of the expected aggregate). However, controlling at least one element per subgroup can be a
difficult task for the attacker, especially when those subgroups are small. If the attacker is able
to choose the compromised nodes, it requires n/r compromised sensors to achieve the previous
errors. The size, r, of the subgroup can be adapted according to the expected power of the
attacker. In addition the subgroup can be randomly created at each round, making impossible
for the attacker to adapt the values sent to the aggregator according to the identity of the nodes
composing each subgroup.
4.3 Subgroup testing strategy
The efficiency of our system is highly dependent on the strategy adopted for the aggregated test.
Our objective is to minimize the verification cost while maximizing the resilience of our system.
We propose a strategy that ensures that the error is smaller than q with 2 log2(r) range tests in
average. Our proposed strategy can be divided into two parts:
• The set of ciphertexts is randomly partitioned into subgroups of equal size r.
• A dichotomic search is performed on each subgroup.
The dichotomic search is described in Algorithm 2. This algorithm implements a recursive
search of the invalid value(s). Each step, a set of ciphertexts is submitted to a range test. If
the result is positive, i.e. the output of the range test is TRUE, the function simply returns the
set of ciphertexts. If the answer is negative and the set is not reduced to one element, this set
is recursively divided into two subsets of equal sizes and each subset is in turn tested with a
q-homogeneous range test. If the answer is negative, and the subset is reduced to one element,
then the ciphertext is discarded by returning the empty set.
Inria
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Algorithm 2 Dichotomic search
Require: q,Agg
r ← #Agg
t← RT (A1, A2, Agg, [0, .., rq])
if t =TRUE then
return Agg
else
if s > 1 then










Note that this algorithm does not discard all the invalid reports. It is possible that invalid
data remain in the subgroup, if their error’s amplitude is low enough to not be detected by the
aggregated range tests. However is this case, the induced error will be small as we will show in
the following paragraph.
4.3.1 Bounds on the error
This algorithm ensure that for each subgroup, the set of r′ ciphertexts returned by the search
procedure does not contain an error with an amplitude larger than q.r′. Indeed, according to
Theorem 1, the search procedure only returns valid sets, i.e. sets Agg′ of r′ elements such as
RT (A1, A2, Agg
′, [0, .., r′q]) = TRUE.
Theorem 1 Let Agg′ be an aggregated set of ciphertexts returned by the search function. Then
RT (A1, A2, Agg
′, [0, .., r′q]) is always TRUE.
Proof The proof is straightforward by recursion.
Since the error in each subgroup is bounded by qr′, then the global error is bounded by
(qr′)(n/r) ≤ qn.
4.3.2 Complexity
The complexity of this strategy varies depending on the number, the amplitude and the positions
of the invalid values. For any subgroup of size r, at least one range test needs to be performed,
but up to a maximum of 2r − 1 range test may be required, depending on the execution of the
dichotomic search algorithm on a subgroup of size r.
A subaggregate of r values can be represented by a binary tree with r leaves (one for each
value), and a depth of log2(r). Each non-leaf node corresponds with an aggregated value. The
dichotomic search can be seen as an exploration of this tree. If a node fails to pass the range
test, the algorithm pursues by exploring the corresponding subtree; otherwise, if the node passes
the range test, the corresponding subtree is not explored. This tree is composed of 2r− 1 nodes;
therefore, the maximum number of range tests to perform is 2r − 1. To attain this maximum,
the number of invalid data must be at least r/2 (in order to require a full depth and width
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exploration). Another interesting case is when there is a unique invalid data and the first range
test return FALSE. In this case a search following one branch is performed until the invalid leaf
is identified. During this in-depth search, 2 nodes are explored for each of the log2(r) level of
the tree. This results in the execution of 2 log2(r) range tests.
If we summarize for the full set, the minimal cost is n/r, the maximum cost is (n/r)(2r−1) =
2n − n/r, and if there is at least one corrupted data per subgroup the cost is (n/r) log2(r). In
the worst case scenario, the aggregated range test approach is more costly than the simple
approach, but this requires that at least half of the data are corrupted. If a random subgroup
selection strategy is adopted this would require that the attacker control half sensors, which

























Figure 3: Comparison of the direct application of range test versus the aggregated range test for
n = 128. The average results are given by simulation of 1000 verifications.
Fig. 3 shows the cost in terms of range tests as a function of the fraction of invalid values for
a system comprising 128 sensors. For the worst case scenario, if the fraction of invalid values is
lower than 17, then the aggregated approach is more efficient, otherwise the standard approach
with a constant cost is more efficient. In the average case, the aggregated approach is better for
a number of invalid values lower than 27.
4.4 Data privacy
In the aggregate range test protocol, the aggregator obtains information on linear combination
of the data. Thus the aggregator could combine the outcomes of those tests to gain information
on individual values. We show that if the aggregator follows a specific rule, i.e. the homogeneous
range tests rule, then it gains no more information than any range test provided on individual
values.
Lemma 2 Any linear combination of q-homogeneous double inequalities is also q-homogeneous.
Proof The proof is straightforward considering first multiplication by a constant and second
combination of two inequalities.
Theorem 3 Let {xi}1≤i≤n be n values, {aj}1≤j≤m be m sub-aggregate and Tj1≤j≤m the cor-
responding range test. If all the Tj are q-homogeneous range test, then ∀ i, the output of the
m range test Tj does not provide more information on xi than the output of any range test
RT(xi, [mq, .., (m+ 1)q]) where m ∈ Z.
Inria
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Proof Let L be the linear system representing the output of the Tj1≤j≤m range tests. If those
inequalities are all q-homogeneous, then any linear combination is also q-homogeneous. In par-
ticular for any inequality a ≤ xi ≤ b, therefore we have a = c.q, b = d.q and b − a = q and this
result correspond to a q-homogeneous range test on the value xi.
According to Theorem 3, if all the range tests performed by the aggregator and the analyst
are following the homogeneous range tests rule then any combination of those range tests provide
the same information that a single range test on this value.
5 Complexity
Up to our knowledge, this is the first time that private range tests are applied in practice, and
there is currently no official implementation of these tests. In Table 1, we give a first evaluation of
the computational cost of a range test in term of number of operations. As encryption/decryption
operations are much more expensive than addition and multiplication (due to the use of under-
lying modified El-Gamal cryptosystem), we sum up the computational complexity in terms of
encryption/decryption operations. A test has a significant cost: our approach to reduce the
number of test execution is therefore justified.
Table 1: Computation cost (encryption and decryption) for one value.
Enc. Dec.
Data producer 1 -
Aggregator (A1) 2 + 18 -
Analyst (A2) 8 24
To know how practical is our scheme, we have implemented a range test. Our implementation
used the El-Gamal cryptosystem with 1024-bit keys. The implementation was done using gmp
5.0.2 and gcc version 4.6.3 on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 processor. For t = 1, a range test is
executed in 108ms.
For the data producer (e.g. sensors), the main complexity is the implementation of El-Gamal
cryptosystem. The elliptic curves El-Gamal cryptosystem has been already investigated for
sensor in [27] and is fully feasible. It also benefits from the support of TinyECC [18].
6 Other solutions
Other solutions to perform private and resilient data aggregation are possible. A first solution
consists to limit the range of the plaintext by choosing an appropriate encryption scheme. The
ciphertexts domain can match the desired range. Encrypting data on a field Fq ensures that
the aggregated values belong to the range [0, .., q − 1]. However, this range may not include the
result of the aggregation (sum) leading to an overflow or an invalid result. If n values lying on
[0, .., q−1] are to be aggregated, the aggregation must be performed in the field Fqn to ensure the
result’s correctness. Before the aggregation, each encrypted value in Fq must be plunged in the
field Fqn. Performing this operation without breaching the confidentiality of the data requires
the use of secure multiparty computation (SMC) [30]. The corresponding SMC protocols are
associated with high complexity operations that involve the sensors themselves. They are not
suitable for devices with limited resources.
Another possible solution is based on cryptographic accumulators [3, 12]. Accumulators
allow to test whether or not an element belongs to a group. Bloom filters [19] can be used to
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design accumulators. These accumulators rely on the one-wayness property of the underlying
hash functions of a Bloom filter. More precisely, we could imagine a system where the nodes
individually send their encrypted values ci = E(xi) to the aggregator using a stream cipher
which is an homomorphic symmetric key primitive as shown in [8]. Then, the aggregator asks
the analyst to provide the corresponding Bloom filter containing the ciphering values of the
interval E(0), .., E(q) for each ci. The aggregator then tests whether or not the received ci value
belongs to the Bloom filter, i.e. testing if the ci value is in the valid interval. The aggregator
computes the sum of the ci that have correctly passed the previous test and sends the aggregated
result to the analyst that could deciphers correctly the sum thanks to the homomorphic property
of the underlying primitive and because the analyst shares with each sensor the corresponding
secret key. As previously presented, this solution could also be adapted using subgroup testing
for more efficiency. However, this solution remains costly in terms of number of exchanged bits
between the aggregator and the analyst: the size of the Bloom filter increases linearly according
to the size of the considered interval and one filter must be sent per value received by the
aggregator.
Finally, one could use Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) protocols, such as [4], to prove that
sensor values belong to a given interval. In those ZKP protocols, a prover proves to a verifier
that it holds a value lying in a given range. A such ZKP protocol could be applied to our problem
by assigning to each sensor the role of prover, while the aggregator would play the role of verifier.
However ZKP are generally costly in term of computations and communications. For instance,
in the protocol proposed in [4] would require that each sensor compute 20 exponentiations per
value (against only one in our scheme). ZKP-based solution therefore appear much more costly
for the sensors that our solution based on private range test.
7 Related work
The issue of corrupted or faulty sensors sending bogus reports has been considered in multi-
ple works. Wagner was the first to introduce the problem of resilience against faulty sensors
in aggregation systems [28]. In addition to a nice formalization of the problem, he studied
the intrinsic resilience of the common aggregation functions (average, min/max, median) and
proposed several algorithms to further improve their robustness. Similarly, Buttyan et al. in-
troduced a solutions [6] [7] capable of filtering outliers in sensor networks. Buttyan’s schemes
assume that the measurements follow a statistical model and use this information to detect and
discard outliers before aggregation, thus creating a resilient aggregation system. As opposed to
our solution, Buttyan’s schemes require the hypothesis that the data follow a particular distri-
bution, whereas our solution does not require any assumption on the data other than the fact
that valid measurements lie in a limited range or set. Moreover, privacy is not considered in all
these works.
A number of works have considered the problem of misbehaving or faulty nodes in tree-based
aggregation systems deployed on wireless sensor networks. In [15], faulty or malicious behavior
in the aggregation process are detected with the aid of cryptographic primitives. However, this
solution only applies to aggregators inside the tree and cannot detect corrupted leaves (sensors).
In SIA [24] the authors consider the problem of data aggregation in a wireless sensor network
where nodes and aggregators can be compromised and may try to corrupt the aggregated data.
They provide an efficient solution for the case of a corrupted aggregator. However, in case of
corrupted sensors, their work relies on the intrinsic resilience of the aggregation function as
in [28]. Contrary to our work, those resilient aggregation systems do not take into account the
privacy of the sensed data. In fact one of their main requirements is that the data are available
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in clear in order to be inspected by various parties of the network. This contradicts our goal to
preserve the confidentiality of users data.
Systems ensuring privacy have been built using homomorphic encryption [29, 13] or secure
multiparty computation [5]. In those systems, each node encrypts or encodes its value before
sending it to the analyst, either directly or through a set of intermediate forwarders and aggre-
gators. In those works, the problem of resilience against malicious or faulty sensors is simply
ignored because the encryption prevents any verification on the data.
A scheme to privately compute statistical queries over distributed databases has been pro-
posed by Chen et. al. in [11]. This work focus on queries that can receive binary answer (TRUE
or FALSE). Answers are encrypted by the data sources with the Goldwasser-Michali (GM) bit
cryptosystem [14]. This cryptosystem provides semantically secure encryption of binary values.
An aggregator is then in charge of forwarding and anonymizing the encrypted answers to the
analyst. Similarly to our solution, the employed cryptosystem permits to check the validity of
each ciphertext without learning the plaintext. Thanks to this feature, the aggregator is able to
filter out the bogus answers while preserving data’s privacy. We note that the solution we are
proposing in this paper also use a ciphertext verification. As opposed to our problem, this work
is limited to binary data and cannot deal with integers, since the GM cryptosystem is reduced
to binary values. In addition, even if the GM cryptosystem is homomorphic, this feature is not
exploited to perform data aggregation in the encrypted domain. In fact, the GM cryptosystem
working on binary values, the homomorphic operations are reduced to the exclusive-or which is
of limited use in our problem.
We note that resilience and privacy in aggregation systems have both been considered by [16]
and [17]. However the robust aspect of this work only considers sensor or link failure. These
solutions can tolerate sensors that omit or fail to send their data, but cannot tolerate sensors
that send bogus data.
In [9], the authors introduce ABBA, a solution for secure aggregation in wireless sensor
networks. The presented system supports a privacy preserving aggregation mechanism as well
as an integrity verification that enable the sink to detect with a high probability the presence
of bogus data in the aggregate. When the integrity check fails, the aggregated value must be
discarded, and it is not possible to neither identify nor isolate the source(s) of the bogus data.
To overcome this issue, one could adopt a dichotomic approach by requesting aggregate values of
smaller sets of sensors in order to narrow down the faulty or compromised sensors. This would
significantly reduce the privacy guarantees of the system, as the aggregated values would be
computed from a smaller number of sensors, increasing the risk of information leak. In addition,
such a dichotomic method would only be effective if the faulty/compromised sensors have a
constant behavior, i.e. if they send bogus data at each round. Intermittent failures of some
sensors or sporadic data corruption would be hard to detect with a dichotomic approach. This
weakness could be exploited by an attacker to mount a Denial of Service (DoS) attack: ensuring
that at least one bogus data is included in the aggregate value at each round would imply that
all the aggregated values are discarded. As opposed to the system proposed in this work, ABBA
relies solely on low-cost symmetric key cryptography. One could envision an hybrid system taking
advantages of the strength of each scheme: the low complexity ABBA system could be sufficient
when no or few bogus values are detected, and above a certain threshold of bogus values, a switch
to our Range-Test based system could be employed.
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8 Conclusion
We have presented a private and resilient data aggregation system based on a private range test.
This system allows to preserve privacy of the data while verifying that an attacker controlling
a subset of the sensors has a limited impact on the aggregated data. This approach could be
compared with the notion of accountability of the end-users as done for example in [23], even if
the verification is not done on individual values but on sub-aggregates.
We have considered in the paper bogus readings from the sensors which attempt to influence
the sum obtained by the analyst. It would be interesting to consider a scenario in which some
sensors collude with the analyst in order to threaten the privacy of a particular user. Application
of our scheme to other aggregation functions such as the median, minimum and maximum would
be worth investigating.
References
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A Range Test Description
We describe here the range test proposed in [21]. Note that an extended version of this proto-
col secure in the active adversary model is presented in [22]. This range test scheme requires
two additive homomorphic1 semantically-secure encryption schemes (E1, D1) and (E2, D2) and
involves two parties: a tester and an authority. The tester holds the encrypted values while
the authority hold the private keys of the two cryptosystems K1priv and K
2
priv. The public keys
of both encryption systems are known by the tester and the authority. In addition, the size
of the encryption systems’ message space Zp1 and Zp2 must satisfy: p2 ≥ 3p1 and p2 must be
1i.e. E(m1)E(m2) = E(m1 +m2).
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prime. The range involved in the test can be any Zq with the condition 5q ≤ p1. The range test
described in [21] relies on a particular Specialized Zero Test [20].
A.1 Specialized Zero Test
Like the range test, this protocol involves two parties, a tester A1 and an authority A2, as well
as an homomorphic asymmetric cryptosystem. The public key is known by both parties but
only the second party (the authority) knows the private key. Given a set of n ciphertexts, this
protocol allows to verify if one of the ciphertext is null, without revealing any information about
the plaintexts. A specialized zero test involving two participants A1 and A2 on the ciphertexts
{c1, . . . , cn} output TRUE if at least one ciphertext is null and false if no null ciphertext is found.
It is denoted ZM(A1, A2|c1, · · · , cn) and it works as follows:
• Q1 chooses a permutation π() on {1, · · · , n} and random integers ri from Zp2\{0} for
i = 1, · · · , n. Then he calculates c′i = c
ri




2, · · · , c
′
n) to A2.
• A2 calculates di = D2(c
′
i) for i = 1, · · · , n one by one until one di is found to be zero or all
the n ciphertexts are decrypted. A2 publishes the output of the zero test as follows:
ZM(A1, A2|c1, · · · , cn) =
{
TRUE if zero found in di
FALSE if no zero in di
A.2 Range Test
In [21], the authors first introduce two range tests efficient in passive adversary model. The first
test called basic range test is implemented as follows:
• The tester (A1) divide the ciphertext c into 2 ciphertext c1 and c2 such that c1 = E1(m1)
and c2 = c/c1, where m1 is randomly chosen in Zp1 . He sends c2 to A2.
• A2 calculates m2 = D1(c2), c
′




• A1 calculates c
′
1 = E2(m1) and e1 = E2(m1 mod q). He then performs with the help of A2























2E2(p1 mod q + q)),
This test is denoted as BR(A1, A2|c). The precise range test that finally allows to test if an ele-
ment belongs to an interval makes two calls to the BR tests: BR(A1, A2|c) and BR(A1, A2|E1(q−
1)/c) in a random order. The output of the precise test (denoted PR(A1, A2|c)) is TRUE if the
two basic range tests output TRUE and FALSE otherwise. In this case, the precise test proves
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